This paper proposes an empirical analysis for asessing the extent to which multinational …rms can e¤ectively support market creation strategies. Our setting focuses on the transition countries, namely ex-socialist countries. Focusing on the lending policy of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), we build an original database by organizing the public records of the credit contracts signed by the EBRD. Our empirical strategy is able to disentangle that the credit selection that favored the entry of foreign multinational corporations into these countries served as one of the pillars for consolidating their transition to the market economy.
Introduction
The role of institutions and their strategies for triggering economic development are topics that have been widely discussed in the economic literature. In the case of developing countries, it is widely known that foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the most e¤ective tools for endorsing the development process. The principal limitation to FDI in ‡ows in these countries, however, is market risk which entails serious concerns about pro…ts when settling economic activities in developing countries (Markusen, 2002) . Therefore, in this context, the presence of an international institution supporting capital ‡ow entry is often considered an e¤ective deterrent to market risk. This paper investigates the determinants of capital entry in a selected sample of countries, namely, the ex-socialist countries, as an e¤ective device for endorsing their economic development and the creation of a market system. We de…ne market system as the existence of a competitive interaction among sellers and buyers in the spirit of a competitive economic exchange process. Under this perspective, foreign …rms (namely, multinational …rms) investing in ex-socialist countries and bringing a competitive culture with them have been expected to be a catalyst for consolidating the market economy during the transition period.
The core of the evidence we discuss in this study consistes of the analysis of the capital ‡ow directed to these countries, intermediated by an international institution: the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, (EBRD). Our argument is that the EBRD adopted a tailored lending strategy by selecting the FDI option as one of the principal driving forces for the creation of a market system in a risky environment.
Our approach is original and novel: we exploit information about the credit contracts granted by the EBRD to tackle a more general question, namely, the capital entry selection as a strategic tool for development. We adopt a two-step strategy. First, we create an original database by organizing the public information on these credit contracts. The contracts include loans and other types of …nancing tools that the EBRD granted to …rms to perform investment projects in one or more ex-socialist countries. 1 Then, focusing on these credit contracts, we are able to control for part of the features that favor the entry of foreign entrepreneurs in transition countries.
Finally, we empirically test the association between the credit selection toward international investors (namely, multinational entreprises -MNEs-) and the consolidation of the market system during the transition process.
The micro-data we examine and the historical period we focus on help to de…ne a simple identi…cation strategy. 1 The EBRD very often just partially …nanced these projects.
Attracting foreign private entrepreneurs in risky host countries is not an easy task, but despite other experiences, the FDI entry process in former socialist countries could count on a key player (i.e the EBRD) that de facto is able to control and drive the foreign investment ‡ows according to speci…c institutional priorities (Bevan and Estrin, 2004) . In this sense, the development process of former socialist countries at the beginning of their transition process may not be fully assimilated to a random or uncontrolled one. Relying on the information disclosed by credit contracts granted by the EBRD to local and foreign entrepreneurs, our goal is to depict how and which FDI in ‡ows were prioritized by the EBRD to support the economic transition to recipient countries.
At the beginning of the EBRD's activity, the country risk (in host markets) was high because of the macroeconomic turmoil. All potential borrowers lacked market experience and had no history of creditworthiness. Further, the credit-granting decisions made by the EBRD were not a¤ected by competition because local banks were insolvent and foreign banks did not enter these risky markets in the early transition period (Lanine and Vander Vennet, 2007) . Inside the transition landscape, as with any economic agent, the objective of the bank is to maximize pro…ts from investment projects by using all the instruments available in the …nancial markets to raise funds and protect its portfolio against risks. 5 Because of its institutional mission, the EBRD also operates with another priority: to foster entrepreneurial activities in the most e¤ective ways. However, the returns to support investments carried out by local or international …rms (MNEs) may not be always identical. In a recent paper, García-Santana (2012) discusses the e¤ectiveness of relying on MNEs to establish a market system in developing countries. This result stems from the lack of …nancial frictions for MNE branches when undertaking FDI in developing countries. His argument is quite intuitive: the real e¤ectiveness of MNE investments triggering the creation of a competitive market in the host countries hinges the possibility that MNEs …nance themselves their own projects and do not address their credit demand to the local credit market. In this sense, in former socialist countries, the goal of supporting the transition process to the market economies can be achieved by adopting a preferential strategy for privileging the investments of international corporations rather than those of native …rms.
The rationale of pushing economic development through MNE entry is widely discussed in Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009) and McGrattan and Prescott (2007) . Lowering barriers to foreign …rms that bring technological advantages to the host economies yields a substantial 5 In fact, the conditions under which the EBRD operates are not totally identical to those of other investment banks. The EBRD aims at being a catalyst for …nancial institutions and wants to avoid crowding them out. In other words, the EBRD does not see other …nancial institutions as competitors (EBRD, 1999) . increase in welfare in those territories (Damijan et al., 2013) . It has been proven that this action can be undertaken successfully by MNE, because having easy access to the international …nancial market means that they can borrow abroad and thus operate at their optimal size in the host markets (García Santana, 2012). A clear example of this practice in developing countries is the empirical analysis proposed by Dang (2013) for Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam, the author shows that FDI is able to not only consolidate the market system, but also improve the quality of local institutions. This framework does not fully apply to the case of …nancing investments in transition countries. In the historical period referenced in this study, even MNEs did not have full access to the open international credit market when considering that investments in transition countries would have been interesting. The EBRD has always represented the key lender. In light of the theories discussed above, one would expect that the EBRD's strategy would be to relax requirements in order to grant credit contracts to the MNEs while being more strict with the native …rms. 6 By exploiting the information disclosed by the (granted) credit contracts, we plan an econometric strategy to identify similarities and di¤erences in the lending policy of the bank conditional on the type of client. Then, we aim at establishing whether the EBRD lending policy really privileged the entry of the MNE at the beginning rather than at the end of the transition period. This result would support the hypothesis that the MNE presence was considered one of the pillars for consolidating the market system.
In developing our analysis, we proceed as follows. In the section that follows, we provide a wide statistical description of the EBRD-client relationship, relying on the content of our database. In Section 3 we introduce our empirical strategy and perform our econometric exercise, and …nally, Section 4 concludes and discusses our results.
The EBRD-client relationship
Our analysis focuses on the very beginning of the transition process. We concentrate on all the credit contracts granted by the EBRD from 1991 to 2003. 7 In this way, we are able to track the activity of the bank during the period in which it was acting as monopolist-credit-granter in this geographical area. This approach will make it easier to de…ne an identi…cation strategy 6 To a certain extent, the institutional role of the EBRD is expected to adjust the imperfection of an incomplete market. 7 Limiting our analysis to this period allows us to focus of the intial transition time when the principal purpose was expected to be the creation of a market economy. The period was characterized by an important privatization process. The strategy of analysis we are proposing would not hold if we extended our time span to after 2003 when several oligarchs became important economic agents in various ex-socialist countries.
to test our working hypothesis.
When considering a potential client for a lending contract, the EBRD follows a standard procedure (Vuylsteke, 1995) . The bank and its client agree to sign the contract; then, the bank …nances the …rm, which makes the investment and pays back the loan (plus interest) to the bank. 8 For the purposes of this study, we built an original database from public data released by the EBRD over time. 9 Our database includes 1,788 …nancial contracts signed by the bank with private and public clients from 1991 to 2003. It contains information in each case on the identity and nationality of the clients, the amount of the contract in ECU/e, the value of the investment project, the sector of investment, the year the contract was signed, the type of contract (loan, share, equity, or guarantee), and other characteristics (old clients, private/public, macro-programs, etc). 10 About 10% of the contracts in the database have been signed by an MNE as a unique borrower. 11 In this section, we present a brief overview of the content of our database and discuss the most relevant descriptive statistics.
The contracts
The number of contracts and the amount of annual investments were very low at the beginning of the transition process (see Figures 1 and 2 ). The EBRD was underusing its capital, and this underuse was a source of criticism among the shareholders and commentators. The underuse was principally due to the severe macroeconomic downturn that a¤ected the entire region. After these initial di¢ culties, the bank's aim was to strongly increase the portfolio volume. The economic recovery of most of the countries in the region helped the EBRD to sign more contracts and to 8 In this section, for the sake of simplicity, we intend the term "loan" to mean any kind of credit contract the bank may propose. 9 We need to clarify an important disclaimer about data at hand. Our database has been built by compiling open-access public data. In public records, information about sensitive features at the …rm level is extremely limited or missing. Furthermore, we have no su¢ cient elements to track our sample of …rms beyond the time we are considering and match our data with other databases to control for …rm performance. Despite these limitations, the data at hand turn out to be su¢ cient to tackle the question we are interested in, and they may also represent the backbone for potential further developments in the future. 1 0 The codi…cation of each entry of this database follows an ad hoc criterion driven by the necessity to organize the public information to which we have access across time. Unfortunately, we are not able to identify each contract with canonical identi…cation numbers (as a VAT number, for instance) of credit recipients. Therefore, fully merging this database with other …rm-level databases to complement the missing information is not possible. 1 1 Several contracts have been signed by a consortium of …rms, and they sometimes involve the presence of a foreign partner. However, tracking the quota of participation of the MNE in the consortium as well as qualifying its participation to the management of the investment is not always possible. Therefore, in these cases, we prefer to include this group of clients with the group of local …rms. According to the information released by the EBRD, the bank designed di¤erent kinds of contracts. These contracts all represent the …nancial instruments by which the bank participates in the realization of the investment project proposed by the borrower. These contracts di¤er not only in the maturity of the credits but also in other characteristics, which we will discuss below. First, in Table 1 , we provide a general overview of the di¤erent kinds of contracts signed by the bank, as well as the frequency of the contracts.
[ Figure 2: EBRD investments by year (ECU/e million).
minority position. 12 The third category of credit instruments refers to guarantee contracts which were used mainly at the end of our dataset period. Through this type of contract, the bank helps borrowers to gain access to …nancial sources through the provision of guarantees (EBRD, 1999). 13 Tables 2 and 3 show descriptive statistics on the total values of projects that were selected by the EBRD and the share that it e¤ectively …nanced. In most accepted projects, the EBRD was not the only lending source. 14 Statistical information is given for the total population and for two periods, one at the outset of the transition (1993) (1994) (1995) and the other at the end of the sample period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . The total project value of loans was always higher than that of shares, but both decreased over time. The median bank lending in loan contracts remained unchanged over time, whereas it declined in share contracts. This fraction increased proportionally with the total project value, 15 but the increase was more pronounced for shares than for loans. As a shareholder, the bank can control the management of the …rm, which implies a reduction in uncertainty associated with imperfect information about the …rm's behavior. The bank tends to 1 2 Equity is considered to be a noncontingent contract. 1 3 According to the OECD (2013), the di¤usion of guarantee contracts in developing countries is a device to reduce the …nancial constraints for SMEs and start-ups. This type of contract represents a positive signal from the SMEs to the market and may entail the starting of a long-term lending relationship between those …rms and other private lenders. 1 4 The contracts issued by the EBRD always require a co…nanced part which may be through cash …nancing from the …rm or, in other cases, from a consortium of commercial banks. However, the involvement of commercial banks in the credit process is strictly subject to EBRD participation. Hence, even in this case, the EBRD plays the role of dominant credit agent. 1 5 The correlation of these two variables is around 0.67. augment its participation with the size of the project value in share contracts in order to protect itself against risk. As for loans, the collateral allows for a control of risk.
[ Table 2 about here]
[ Table 3 about here]
Countries and sectors
Two criteria can account for the geographical distribution of contracts between 1991 and 2003:
market size (population size or income per capita) and political regime. Figure 3 shows the geographical distribution of EBRD investments in cumulated terms per capita by country. The
Central European countries, which are the most developed countries of the population and which led the transition process, received the largest per capita …nancing (around 300,000 euros for Slovenia, Croatia, and Estonia), while the Central Asian countries lag behind signi…cantly. The
Central Asian countries have not only a poor business climate but also non-democratic institutions. We perform other statistical analysis to obtain more evidence. We split the distribution into three subperiods (1991-1995, 1996-1999, and 2000-2003) . Table 4 shows that at the beginning of the transition process, almost half of the investments went to the early starters, in the Central European and Baltic states. Their share later reduced to roughly one-third of the total because it is very likely that in these destinations, the transition process to a market system was quickly established. During the transition process, Russia received an increasing proportion of EBRD investment and its share remained stable. Southeastern Europe saw a progressive increase in its share of EBRD investment during this period. The relative share in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus decreased. Finally, Central Asian countries reached a noticeable share between 1996 and 1999, which fell by half during the …nal period.
[ Table 4 about here]
[ Table 5 about here]
As for the distribution by sector (Table 5) , 16 at the beginning of the transition, most of EBRD …nancing went to the Finance, Telecom, and Oil/Gas/Natural Resources sectors. 17 the priority to create a market system, in the …rst period of the transition, the objectives were to …nance infrastructure and to restructure the banking and manufacturing sectors. Thereafter, in the second stage of the development process, the focus of the bank switched to …nancing the creation of small and medium-sized enterprises.
Our principal working hypothesis is that the MNEs have been strategically selected by the EBRD to support the transition process to a market system, above all at the very beginning when only a few enterprises were active in the host markets. Nevertheless, one could also argue that the strategic choice of supporting MNE projects can simply be driven by the evidence that the types of projects MNEs carry out in transition countries concentrated in less risky (or variable) sectors. This is not the case, however, as supported by the pertinent statistics in Table   6 . Considering our whole sample and selecting the sectors accounting for at least 5% of the overall projects …nanced by the EBRD, it turns out that the percentage of …nanced projects (by sector) are identical for both the MNEs and the local …rms. Furthermore, these percentages do not vary a lot for the two most important sectors (bank and …nance). Again, the data con…rm that once the bank planned the strategy to create a market system, all of its lending policy served that purpose.
[ Table 6 about here]
Empirical strategy
The EBRD's strategy combines both its concern about …nancing feasible projects that have positive economic returns in the host market with its expectation that the credit would be paid back by the borrower in due course. Our empirical exercise builds on these two assumptions, and we aim to clarify the potential di¤erences in credit granting strategies when investment projects are implemented by local or international …rms.
Before proceeding with the analysis, the relationship between the value of the contract and the value of the investment project deserves some comments. Taking the logarithm of the value of the credit (LIV) and the logarithm of the ratio between the value of the credit and the value of the investment project (LQ_IV), one can easily detect that no direct proportionality exists between the value of the investment and the part …nanced by the EBRD. The value of the credit is de…nitely a one-pick distribution, whereas the share is a two-pick one. Therefore, the value of the credit granted by the EBRD is not just a function of the value of a project, but also a combination of several other factors. The scope of our empirical strategy is to learn more and clarify these further determinants under an economic development perspective.
Econometric speci…cation
In order to run our econometric exercise, we match data referring to a few characteristics of the contracts signed by the bank with other data referring to the environment in which the investment project was run. The principal di¢ culty is identifying the proper indicators to run the estimations according to the data at hand. To that end, we refer to the current …ndings in the economic literature.
To identify the local economic environment in which investors were expected to operate in host countries, we consider four di¤erent indicators that aim at capturing the most relevant factors a¤ecting business activity: type of regime, purchasing capacity of local citizens, degree of trade liberalization, and advances in the privatization process as an indicator of the market system consolidation process.
The level of local wealth, as an index of the purchasing capacity of the local population, is represented by the value of year GDP per capita (in $). The measure of the level of development of democratic institutions is taken from the Polity IV project. This is a coded index for the level of democracy (DEM) of independent states. This index varies between minus ten (for an absolute autocracy) and plus ten (for a fully ‡edged democracy). It is obtained by combining the evaluation of di¤erent elements (for instance, the independence of the executive authority, openness of the executive recruitment, regulation of the chief recruitment process, and individual participation in the election system, among the others) that allow for determining the quality of a regime's democracy. 18 Speci…c features of the transition process are embedded in three indicators developed by the EBRD: governance and enterprise restructuring (GOV), large and small scale privatization (SB_P), and trade and foreign exchange system liberalization (FOREX).
The annual values of the GOV indicator (ranging from 1 to 4 as a continuous variable) are determined by taking into account the …nancial discipline at the enterprise level, the credit and subsidy policies for business activities, and the degree of e¤ective corporate control exercised through the …nancial institutions. The SB_P indicator (again, a continuous variable larger 1 8 Refer to  the  Polity  IV  website  for  details  on  how  the  scores  are  computed: www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. than 1) tracks the degree of the privatization process, referring to information on the no-state ownership of small enterprises, the e¤ective tractability of the land, and the di¤usion of private ownership that aims at achieving the same type of performance as in advanced countries. Finally, the FOREX index (a continuous variable larger than 1) embeds the degree of free import/export regime, the current account convertibility, the removal of the tari¤ barriers, and eventually the accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although these indexes are determined via qualitative assessments, the previous indicators (namely, GOV, SB_P, FOREX and DEM)
are not strongly correlated. There is a low and positive but statistically signi…cant correlation among them (when for statistical reasons all variables are considered in logarithm, refer to Table   7 ). The unique weak negative correlation is between the democracy and privatization process: a reasonable assumption is that established democracies usually do not run large, important privatization programs.
In addition to the variables controlling for the local environment of investors, we also intro- that debt contracts are optimal when the lender is conservative, whereas equity contracts are optimal when the lender is aggressive. For instance, investments by small …rms in tangible assets such as equipment or property are expected to be …nanced by debts.
Our empirical strategy owes much to the previous contributions. The maturity of a credit contract is di¤erent for each category of contract, and the type of contract is an approximate indicator of this credit maturity, as mentioned above. We thus consider that the amount of the credit contract is supposed to be the result of a combination of market conditions and expected return on investment.
In addition to the value of the credit (IV) granted by the EBRD to the …rm, we also take into account features such as the type of the contract, the year it was signed, and the return on investment. The latter can be approximated, for a solvent …rm, by the value of its productive investment (namely, logarithm data labeled LIP in the database). This investment value is the minimum level of return of any successful productive investment by the …rm, which corresponds to its capacity for repayment. By adopting this hypothesis, we are following and extending the results achieved by Holmström (1999) , who proved that the investment decision and the distinguishing characteristics of this investment represent a way to disclose the unknown characteristics of an agent. Finally, since other potential importantly features of each client (for instance, the risk evaluation of the clients, the type of collateral associated with each contract)
are unavailable, we can control only for the identity of the client by being able to discriminate between a private or public (Public) client. 19 Finally, we also introduce …rm or contract …xed e¤ects to control for the omitted variables for each signed contract. A description of the variables is given in Box 1.
[Box 1 about here]
Our empirical strategy consists of running two di¤erent estimation exercises in order to identify the discriminating …nancing strategy that favors MNE …nancing over the one for local enterprises (if any) as a device for supporting the market creation system. To this end, we …rst regress the credits granted to the two groups of …rms against the same group of control variables.
In this way, we aim at assessing that the conditions yielding the credit granting to MNE are di¤erent from the ones for local enterprises.
We formulate our …rst empirical model as follows. In order to control for the very high variance of observation in our sample, and to ensure the conditions for signi…cant estimations, we take all of our variables in logarithm. Let us de…ne the dependent variable (value of the credit) as Y (LIV ): The amount of the credit for …nancing an investment project is de…ned as LIV itjs, with i = f irm; t = year, j = host country, and s = sector . We consider a group of independent variables to be associated with the contacts (i.e., LIP and Public) and the general market conditions in the host country (i.e., LDEM, LGDP, LFOREX, LGOV and LSB_P ). We also include an interaction term (DEM jt year t ) between the democracy index and the time dummies. This term is meant to track possible changes in the variable democracy over time in each country. Therefore, the equation we consider can be de…ned as follows:
LGOV jt + 5 LGDP jt +(1)
Our database is not a true panel but rather a pooling of independent cross sections over time. Hence, we need to control for heterogeneity problems. As argued in Wooldridge (2006), 1 9 In the case of MNEs being a P ublic client means being a foreign-state-owned-enterprise (usually managing a public service such as transport activities of public facilities) that invests in a transition country. The identi…cation of P ublic is then applied to the identity of the credit applicant irrespective of the type of the investment it is planning to carry out.
this pooled structure implies that the dependent variable may have di¤erent distributions in di¤erent time periods; to control for this, we need to introduce some time …xed e¤ects ( t ):
The same reasoning applies to the sector dimension, for which we include some sector …xed e¤ects ( s ): In addition, as shown, for instance, in Baltagi (2008), we also need to include the unobservable time-invariant individual-speci…c e¤ect ( i ) to control for the heterogeneity problem as much as possible. Controlling for all of these e¤ects allows us to decompose the error term (" itjs ) in the following way:
where i is the unobservable time-invariant individual-speci…c e¤ect, t the time …xed e¤ects, s the sector …xed e¤ects, and itjs denotes the remaining disturbances, which are now expected to be IID(0; 2 ):
The choice of the variable i turns out to be crucial for obtaining independence between the residuals and the dependent variable. In our estimations, we are alternating …rm and contract …xed e¤ects, and we will also control for …rm or contract clustering errors. The contract type is in fact time invariant according to EBRD statements. In running this …rst exercise, we expect to get di¤erent results when applying the same model to our di¤erent subsamples. In particular, in light of the theory discussed by García-Santana (2012), it is also likely that all other regressors will lose part of their statistical signi…cance in the case of MNEs, with respect to the amount of credit the EBRD would grant MNEs on the basis of their reputation, projects, or sectors of activity.
[ Table 8 about here] Table 8 provides descriptive statistics for some of these variables for the overall period and for two speci…c years: 1993 and 2003. 20 The dependent variable is the …nancing amount (IV ) granted by the EBRD. This is one of the variables in the bank's pro…t function, which depends negatively on the riskiness of the project. 21 This re ‡ects both the screening process and the incentive mechanism that takes place between clients. In our population, this index declines over time because the EBRD …nanced democracies in Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the transition and later started to …nance autocratic countries in Central Asia.
The second exercise builds on the results of the …rst one and aims at tackling a simple question: is the potential discrimination of clients by native and MNE truly a device to sustain 2 0 We prefer to discuss this evidence by referring to the original data (namely, without the logarithm transformation) to provide a realistic discussion of the available information. 2 the creation of the market system? If this were the case, the selection of MNE projects is expected to be more intense at the beginning of the transition period (when the democratic process is not fully consolidated) with a reduction in intensity over time.
In order to test this hypothesis, we run the following estimation:
In the previous equation, we gather a selected number of variables that focus on the importance of some institutional variables on the size of the granted credits. First, we introduce LDEM jt , which tracks the consolidation of a democratic system in the host economies. As usual, LGOV jt ; LF OREX jt and LSB_P jt are expected to capture the most salient features of the business environment in the host markets. Furthermore, we introduce a dummy for selecting the credits granted to M N E i ;and the key variable of this exercise is the interaction term between the two previous variables (LDEM jt M N E i ). If our hypothesis were true (namely, MNEs are an important device for consolidating the market system in the host countries), the coe¢ cient 3 is expected to be negative and statistically signi…cant, meaning that the size of the credit granted to MNEs is important at the beginning of the transition period. As soon as countries are able to consolidate the democratic regimes, the size of the credits granted to MNEs is expected to reduce. The remaining variables capture the importance of tailoring the granted credit to the type of clients. According to the OECD (2013), loan contracts are most extensively used when clients are able to provide the proper collateral and allow the bank to share the lower degree of risk. Here, we consider that MNEs as international investors have the …nancial capacity to provide su¢ cient collateral to the bank. Hence, we introduce the dummy dloan itjs to select the credit contracts granted as a loan, and the interaction term dloan itjs M N E i to track how extensively these contracts are exploited in the case of MNEs. As in the …rst exercise, we introduce time and sector …xed e¤ects as well as the interaction terms (DEM jt year t ): Finally, we control the heteroskedasticity problem with either the White or the cluster (by contract) correction of errors.
Results
We begin by focusing on the estimation of (1).
First, we concentrate on the full sample, and then we divide it into two groups: local …rms and MNEs. We proceed …rst by assessing whether the …xed e¤ect model should be preferred to the pooled ordinary least square (OLS) model (with the F-test) by selecting the most e¢ cient estimation strategy, determined by choosing between contract or …rm …xed e¤ects. In all of the regressions, we control for heteroskedasticity by applying either the White or the cluster correction. 22 
The full sample
To begin we …rst consider all contracts in order to identify the main factors that can in ‡uence the selection of credit granted by the EBRD. Table 9 shows the output of the OLS estimations for the pool of observations when considering the year and sector dummies and an interaction term (DEM*years), which takes into account the transition of the political regime in the host countries toward democracy. In order to control for heteroskedasticity problems, we correct the residuals with either the White or the cluster method. The cluster method is appropriate, since it allows us to take into consideration the fact that one …rm can apply for more than one contract. As one might expect, the adoption of …xed e¤ects in the estimation of the full sample turns out to always be extremely signi…cant in the case of contract …xed e¤ects but not …rm …xed e¤ects. It is likely that the type of contract signed by the client is somewhat the result of the bank's screening process, and that is automatically de…ned by the contractual condition a …rm is required to ful…ll. It is also worth noting that the cluster error correction strategy improves the quality of the estimation. The importance of adopting the cluster error correction strategy stresses that there exist some latent components across the contracts that we need to take into consideration and possibly disentangle.
The results we obtain are robust overall (Tables 9 and 10 ). The proxies of the repayment capacity (LIP ) and the GDP per capita of the host country (i.e., the level of local income) have a positive impact on the amount of credit, con…rming the existence of a potential market for business in these countries. Being a public borrower also has a positive impact (when the coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cant) on the amount of credit, which can be interpreted as a guarantee for being a solvent client. By contrast, the group of variables representing the business environment (LGOV, LFOREX and LSB_P ) in the host country are basically not statistically signi…cant, with a few exceptions where they display a negative coe¢ cient: the lack of su¢ cient established market conditions hampers the investment activity. Instead, the LDEM index seems to have a more signi…cant impact on investment attractiveness, and even its coe¢ cient is sensitive to the type of correction (i.e., contract or …rm …xed e¤ects) we are adopting. The negative sign associated with the democracy index indicates that the EBRD increasingly invests in less democratic countries over time (see Subsection 2.2). This can be explained by the fact that at the beginning of the transition, what little credit the EBRD granted was mostly to more democratic countries. It then increased its supply of credit to all types of regimes, and …nally increased its investment in less democratic countries as more democratic countries started to be …nanced by private investment banks. A positive and strongly signi…cant coe¢ cient associated with the existence of a democratic regime in the country hosting the investments should con…rm that the strength of a property rights system is an interesting incentive for granting credit.
[ Table 9 about here]
[ Table 10 about here]
Having considered the full sample, we now divide the sample into two subsamples in order to verify the robustness of our results. The …rst subsample includes only local …rms, and the second is composed of MNEs.
Local …rms
The result of the F-test shows that the …xed e¤ect model (by contract) should be preferred to the pooled model (Table 11) . Instead, the …rm-individual …xed e¤ects perform very poorly.
Our estimate with contract …xed e¤ects suggests that almost one-third of the variation in the amount of …nancing is related to the di¤erent types of contract (Baltagi, 2008; Baum, 2006) . In line with the interpretation provided above and the …ndings from the theoretical literature, we should expect the EBRD to face a higher risk when …nancing the projects of independent native …rms in host markets at the beginning of their activities. Therefore, the choice of a speci…c group of contracts rather than others has to be considered a strategy to protect itself against that risk.
As for the signi…cance of the coe¢ cient, the value of the investment project (which we interpret as a measure of the …rm's repayment capacity) is always highly signi…cant. The public identity of a client turns out to be important because a public client may be considered by the bank to be less risky than a private one. It is strongly signi…cant in the case of pooled OLS estimations and also when controlling for contract …xed e¤ects. These results suggest a certain tendency to consider public agents more reliable for certain types of contracts, but less reliable than private …rms for others. Instead, the income variable (LGDP ) turns out to be signi…cant with the expected sign only in the case of contract …xed e¤ects. 23 It seems that the level of income of the host country matters just for a selected number of projects in which local …rms are likely to run some commercial activities addressed to the local population. According to our working hypothesis, the EBRD credit granting strategy to local entrepreneurs is expected to be subject to the condition that the degree of market economy (in the host country) needs to achieve at least a minimum lower bound to be e¤ective. Instead, the coe¢ cients of the variables describing the economic environment (LGOV, LFOREX and LSB_P ) are not statistically signi…cant at all, whereas the coe¢ cient of the democracy variable is negative and statistically signi…cant only in the case of controlling for contract …xed e¤ects or clustering residuals by contracts (Table 12) . 24 This result tends to con…rm the o¢ cial claim that the EBRD promotes democratic institutions in transition countries regardless of the position of a country in the transition process. The time dimension does not always seem to be relevant in a number of our speci…cations; again, this could embed the general idea of the EBRD's mission to foster transition from a long-run perspective (Table 11 ).
[ Table 11 about here]
[ Table 12 about here]
To sum up, for local …rms the …xed e¤ects by type of contract turn out to be a good measure for identifying certain elements of the …nancing strategy of the bank over time. Each contract signed by the bank is granted according to the individual characteristics of the client. Having established this result, we now turn to the second subsample, composed of multinational …rms, to assess the possible di¤erences in the determinants of credit granting as compared with the …rst subsample.
Multinational …rms
In our full sample, the total amount of credit granted to projects with an MNE as the unique borrower is relatively small. However, despite this limitation, we can focus on this speci…c group of …rms to draw a …rst set of conclusions about the potential importance of favoring the entry of MNEs in transition countries as a pillar for supporting the creation of a market economy.
Referring to the descriptive statistics in Table 8 , we easily detect that the average amount of credit granted to an MNE, the size of the total investment, and the …nancing share are lower for MNEs than for local …rms. This may re ‡ect the fact that MNEs can apply for credits in international markets or pay for part of their investment in cash (as argued by Burstain, 2009, and García-Santana, 2012). The results of our econometric estimations are presented in Tables   13 and 14 . The outcomes are quite robust and consistent across the di¤erent speci…cations.
The picture that emerges from these estimations is clearly distinguishable from the one associated with local …rms. First, the income of the host markets is never signi…cant: the MNE investments and detached from the income level of the destination markets, meaning that their investments target something more beyond obtaining a higher market potential for their business. Furthermore, the size of the credit granted to MNEs always has a quite negative (and statistically signi…cant) association with the level of democracy and market openness. Once more, MNEs truly seem to be an anchor for the transition process. The EBRD seems to endorse their entry into quite close but not fully ‡edged democratic countries. Finally, as usual, the size of the credit (LIP ) is positively related to the value of the project and the condition of being a foreign public enterprise (PUBLIC ) 25 two positive factors that determine the size of the credit.
According to our working hypothesis, this result con…rms that the EBRD credit strategy privileges the MNE investment to foster the transition process to a market economy. Controlling for contract …xed e¤ects does change the estimation results, but these e¤ects turn out to be important (their is around 0.86) and help to shrink the standard errors. Our …ndings suggest that MNE investment projects were principally …nanced only on the basis of their quality, sector of destination, and the proper bank-tailored contracts to meet the needs of MNEs.
If our results were true, however, we cannot disregard that time matters: one would expect a clear association between the contract granted to the MNE and the time it was signed. In order to truly support the market creation process, the entry of MNEs should be favored at the beginning of the transition process. Our …nal set of estimations focuses exactly on this issue:
establishing the extent to which the size of the granted credit turned to be a device to push the entry of MNEs in transition economies preferably at the beginning of the transition. Table 15 displays our last set of estimations focusing on (3). First, our results are consistent and robust irrespective of the di¤erent estimation strategies we adopt. The most salient (and expected) outcome is the negative and always quite statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient of the covariate LDEM jt M N E i : According to our working hypothesis, this result con…rms that the entry of MNEs was privileged by the bank at the beginning of the transition period when host countries were building a democratic system. The interpretation of this result is strongly supported by the negative and again, always quite statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient of the covariate embedding the status of the privatization process (LSB_P ). As soon as the privatization process started improving, the size of the EBRD credits started reducing. Finally, the relative singular position of MNEs in this credit granting process is also documented by the type of contract that they were likely to enjoy. As also shown in Table 15 , the negative and statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient of the interaction term dloan itjs M N E i reveals that the credits granted to MNEs were transferred through forms other than the canonical loan contracts usually exploited for …nancing activities in risky markets (OECD, 2013). Once more, MNEs enjoyed a reputation e¤ect that allowed for obtaining less binding credit contracts.
[ Table 13 about here]
[ Table 14 about here]
[ Table 15 about here]
Conclusions and discussion
The dataset exploited in this study allows us to focus on the strategy adopted by the EBRD in granting credit with respect to the type of applicant. The EBRD was in a situation of monopoly in many transition countries, and the purpose of the activity was to support the transition to a market economy. The EBRD's shareholders are sovereign and assigned to the bank its mission to foster and not crowd out …nancial ‡ows toward the private sector in these countries. According to our results, the entry of MNEs in transition countries aimed at being a pillar for consolidating the transition to a market economy. MNEs were expected to help foster the creation of a market economy. Some of our results con…rm this hypothesis.
Let us focus on the elasticity between the credit size and the variation of the democracy index: for local …rms, the credit size it is almost inelastic (its magnitude is around 0.45%), whereas it is extremely elastic in the case of MNE credits (around 2.45%). In the same vein, the MNE credit size turns out to be more elastic with respect to the value of the investment project (around 0.86%) when compared with the case of local …rms, with an elasticity settling between 0.70% and 0.80%. In the bank's expectations, investments carried out by local …rms are likely to be successful in an economic environment once the path toward a market economy is established. The sensitivity to the income level (namely GDP) is proof: credit granted to
MNEs is completely inelastic against income variations in host countries, whereas credit granted to local …rms is a bit more sensitive, with an elasticity of about 0.08%.
The need to cope with high credit risk unambiguously forces the bank to adopt measures of protection using a client-screening scheme. As discussed in the economic literature, there is no unique scheme available to be implemented. In our sample, a screening device as general as the Could the EBRD experience be transposed and adopted as a feasible strategy in other situations? It is undeniable that the proper selection of the projects is useful for driving the economic development as well as attracting the most e¢ cient investors. The strategy implemented by the EBRD, however, cannot be considered a true benchmark strategy, since it relies on this speci…c feature: the EBRD operated as a monopolist in …nancing investments in transition countries at the beginning of the transition process. It was able to …ne-tune foreign entry with respect to the evolution of the local economic environment as well. It is not so evident that replicating these types of market conditions will guarantee the attainment of the development objectives.
Nevertheless, more discussion could be generated if we were to investigate further results and insights by completing the statistical information at hand. First, we could re…ne the structure could obtain more precise data about the impact of the EBRD's …nancing policies. In particular, it could be possible to plan an exercise to discuss to the extent to which the EBRD's intervention has been e¤ective in the long run and, eventually, the way it has been able to be a catalyst for mobilizing private investment …nancing after 2003. Groups 13 13 *** 1% signi…cance level; ** 5%; * 10% . 
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